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Privatising Power Cuts?
Ownership and Reform of State Electricity Boards in India




This book discusses the functioning of the State Electricity Boards (commonly known as SEBs)
of India and the implications of the new liberalized approach. It argues that these institutions
have always been effectively under the thumb of the government, no matter what the cosmetic
dressing. The real power has always vested with someone who has been appointed by the
concerning state government. The book traces the history of the state electricity boards and
goes into operational details such as the manpower configurations, thefts, Transmission and
Distribution losses (T&D) and other technical aspects. It argues for a re-energization of these
institutions and provides a few solutions as to how this can be done. It offers insights into
this most complex issue, which must be eventually solved, one way or the other, if the power
sector is really to take off and investments from the private sector and multilateral agencies
are to be encouraged.
Historical Perspective of SEBs
Before 1998, the planning commission used to set policies in coordination with the union
Ministry Of Power (MOP). MOP used to control NTPC, NHPC, Powergrid etc., and these
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entities used to report to MOP. MOP also
used to set policies for SEBs and NTPC,
NHPC, etc., used to sell the energy to SEBs
while the SEBs used to get the plan funds
from the planning commission and loans
from the Power Finance Corporation. After
the passing of the Electricity Act 2003, NTPC, NHPC, Powergrid etc., can directly be involved
in generation, transmission, distribution as licensees and state governments may postpone
the subsidies meant for the agriculture and domestic consumers or allocate the subsidies
as happened in Haryana earlier and as is happening in different states like Andhra Pradesh.
SEBs have gone through different phases but have basically never been divorced from the
political environment of the states and central governments. This connection has influenced
all the decisions of the SEB-budgeting , metering, allotment of the connections, postings,
etc. Due to this, the SEBs have never been able to run professionally.
 In 1998, through a series of detailed surveys, the Government of India found several
operational inefficiencies like poor billing and collection, imbalances in the mix of generation
sources, unmanageable sizes and monolithic structures in the power sector. In 2002, the
Planning Commission also reported significant losses in power because of lack of
transmission capacity, improper maintenance of the power plants and significant damages
of distribution transformers. Moreover, the nontechnical losses like theft, bribing and stealing
of power are very much there due to the political inputs involved. The need of the hour
therefore is to find effective and practicable mechanisms to reduce the technical and
nontechnical losses of the power. Let us go into some of the aspects dealt with by the author,
in more detail.
The Hierarchical Organizations in SEBs
The following figure provides a basic description of the organizational hierarchy in a typical
State Electricity Board.
As shown in the figure, SEB is headed by a Chairman who is assisted by various members
of the Board. These members represent functions such as technical services/operations,
finance, accounts, etc. The state SEB controls zones, circles, divisions, subdivisions, etc.,
headed by the Chief Engineer, Superintendent, Executive Engineer, SDO and Junior Engineer
respectively. The Chairman is a political appointee. With so many functions and sub
functions in the SEB, the areas of accountability tend to get blurred. The problem is basically
that so many levels really do not show the clear transparency and accountability, and
responsibilities are all overlapping which further blurs the issue.
The administrative functioning is also very haphazard  and needs a number of clearances
between levels. The authorization of expenditure requires a huge administrative effort, with
several technical and administrative clearances, and is likely to take a disproportionate
amount of time. Moreover, it is often the case that the respective roles of the Secretary (power)
in the State Government and the Chairman of the Electricity Board are overlapping, thereby
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adding to the confusion, and decision-making becomes a matter of political clout and
standing, rather than technical or financial suitability.
Budgeting and Expense Allocation
There are various issues for serious consideration, one of the most serious being the system
of budgetary allocations. The budget is operated according to the public accountancy rules.
There is neither the possibility of relocating funds from one budget to another (capital,
revenue or establishment) or reallocating from one activity to another. There is also the
compulsion to spend the money before the end of the financial year, whether the projects
are ready or not. All this leads to poor credibility, poor habits of spending and slipshod
creditworthiness. This  reduces the creditworthiness of the SEBs thereby reducing the
chances of external funding sharply. The whole burden therefore becomes a liability on
the state’s exchequer.
Even if the activity and the budgeting are right, there is a lot of ambiguity in utilizing
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the funds, between various levels, especially in matters of allocation between headquarters
and field. There is no direct allocation of actual cash to field. Once the budget is decided,
the physical inputs of the divisions and circles are provided directly from the board, and
are accounted on paper. These allocations are granted only on duly argued requests by the
fields along a process starting only at the moment the needs occur.
No actual money is given to the field officers and budget allocations do not allow the
field to use of its discretionary authority to standardize operations and evolve a set procedure.
Therefore each decision has to be taken separately and thus generates a different flow chart
which leads to several complications, delays, and an inability to measure and account for
the same.
Technical and Nontechnical Losses
State governments and SEBs are two important arms to supply the quality power and both
of them are dependent on each other. In this case, the state governments tend to exercise
tight control on what they regard as a politically sensitive area. SEBs still enjoy the quasi
monopoly in the power sector. Initially it was the electricity departments which used to
run things. The SEBs replaced the Electricity Departments in 1956 in the hope that institutions
with expertise would come up. The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) was to provide all
the guidance and advice to the ministry of power and the SEBs on the policy related technical
aspects.
The SEBs are dependent on the respective state governments and thus they are politically
influenced. In Punjab, the state government decided to provide free electricity to agriculture
and the same trend is now being adopted in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu
also. When the free power became impossible in Punjab, the government decided to install
the metering facility and introduced a flat rate based on the specification of pumpsets .The
political influence was such that the tariffs did not increase over the time and the subsequent
transmission losses created more burden on the SEBs. It is, however, doubtful that the subsidies
given by the SEBs for the rural electrification reach the targeted users, which are the farmers.
Thus there is a crucial need to make the system efficient without compromising on the financial
status.
Tariffs and the Financial Situation
India lives in a world of differential tariffs for
electricity. Agricultural sector needs to pay
less than the domestic or industrial sector and
the domestic users have to pay less than the
industries.  This differential leads to a
substantial corruption because there could be
considerable savings, on redesignation of a
consumer. Such a differentiated tariff structure
is created and continued because of the
Amounts of Money to be Paid by the SEBs
to the Central Sector Power Undertakings
By March 1997 Rs. 12,250 cr
By March 2001 Rs. 26,400 cr
By March 2002 Rs. 40,000 cr
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political compulsions and the societal demographics as well. The state governments have
to subsidize the financial deficits through heavy subsidies to the SEBs. This has led the SEBs
to an even more difficult financial situation. The preceding table reveals the financial
conditions of the SEBs.
Reporting System
The reporting system in the SEBs is totally ambiguous in nature. There are two important
types of reports generated in this system i.e., financial reports and technical reports. The
technical reports go to the member technical and the billing and other financial reports go
to the member finance. It has been found that these two reports are not checked by any
forum at the SEBs. The comparison of such reports is important as the member technical
is more concerned with the losses of power and the member finance with the budgeting.
Unless these two reports show some signs of consistency, it is quite easy to manipulate
them without any crosscheck. The agriculture consumption and the theft are two important
aspects in reporting the technical losses besides the actual T & D losses. Therefore, unmetered
power consumption is often hidden under the heading of agriculture, and hence this tends
to lead to a delay in tariff collection. In the billing report, the adjustments are so done,
that sometimes more than 100% collection efficiency is reported as the collection of past
months is done in the current month. In short, there is no system of consistent crosschecks,
by which clear-cut technical and financial status of the SEBs, on a monthly  basis, can be
evaluated with a degree of certainty.
Reforms
There are two ways of doing this
i) Enterprization of SEBs based on public control, or
ii) Private ownership in whole or part.
The World Bank supports the latter and has been funding several states for the same.
There are pros and cons in both the approaches. In the former, the state government might
use ways and means to go slowly. Pure privatization has had its problems also, notably in
Orissa and Maharashtra. There is also an issue of how to transfer property rights in an
organization, where property rights do not exist. The system of performance contracts and
MOUs for specific tasks, appears to be via media solution. An MOU is a written contract
between the public organization and the government, specifying the objectives and targets
to be met. The experiences of similar contract plans/MOUs have been very successful in
France and Korea. However, care must be taken that there is not an undue emphasis on
“social objectives” when drawing up the MOUs.
In 1998, Kerala restructured the SEB through a new state power policy and established
three profit centers i.e., generation, transmission and distribution. But, it is found that these
were only paper documents and nothing has been changed in terms of actual ground level
operations. If anything has been changed, it is only the new accounting system and there93 Book Review
are hardly any changes in processes, enterprization and authority of the state over the
electricity board. The measurement system of physical inputs and outputs remained the same.
There are several risks associated with such projects such as regulatory and business risks,
but, in the end, the private investors are more concerned with the value of return of their
investment and the certainty of return. Because of “un-enterprised” nature of SEBs, they are
unable to win the confidence of the investors because they cannot give a clear indication
of the possible range of returns. This “Lack of Enterprization” has led to low transparency
about the bidding process and other operations. To win the confidence of the investors, there
needs to be an actual and measurable improvement in the ways human resources,
management and the operations work. Otherwise the investors will devalue the projects,
and, in some cases, there will be not a single bidder as in the distribution case of central
zone of Orissa. The OERC in Orissa, could not get a grip on what was happening vis-a-
vis the collection percentages, which kept on raising. The privatization of distribution in
Delhi is a success story as the state government has contractualized anything that could be
done so. The rights of the private distribution company were laid down very clearly, thus
allowing the said parties to have a fairly accurate measure of the risks and returns involved.
Conclusion
The author has gone into the root processes of the SEBs, particularly the budgetary and
operations systems. Basically, there is a need to find a via media between complete
privatization and total domination by the State Governments (to the point where the SEBs
have no identity of their own). The book discusses the pros and cons of such issues, both
from an investors’ perspective as well as a state’s perspective. The financial and budgetary
systems, as well as the operational autonomy of the SEBs, need a great deal of revision.
There needs to be standardization of the reporting system, reduction in the number of reports
(there were as many as 177 in Haryana Electricity Board) and greater consistency between
the various reports, so that crosschecks can be made. Manipulations can still be there, but
there is every chance that they may be found out someday in black and white. The allocation
of authority, especially at the field levels, needs to be improved, and standard problems
should draw standardized responses basically, in  majority of the cases.
One of the more acceptable ways to improve the functioning is to improve the system
of contracting for specific tasks. From this could grow further avenues to improve the
health and operations of the SEBs, thereby allowing them to attract the capital at some
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